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ABSTRACT
Remote Direct Memory Access (RDMA) is becoming widely avail-
able in data centers. This technology allows a process to directly
read and write the memory of a remote host, with a mechanism to
control access permissions. In this paper, we study the fundamental
power of these capabilities. We consider the well-known problem
of achieving consensus despite failures, and find that RDMA can
improve the inherent trade-off in distributed computing between fail-
ure resilience and performance. Specifically, we show that RDMA
allows algorithms that simultaneously achieve high resilience and
high performance, while traditional algorithms had to choose one
or another. With Byzantine failures, we give an algorithm that only
requires n ≥ 2fP +1 processes (where fP is the maximum number of
faulty processes) and decides in two (network) delays in common ex-
ecutions. With crash failures, we give an algorithm that only requires
n ≥ fP +1 processes and also decides in two delays. Both algorithms
tolerate a minority of memory failures inherent to RDMA, and they
provide safety in asynchronous systems and liveness with standard
additional assumptions.
1 INTRODUCTION
In recent years, a technology known as Remote Direct Memory
Access (RDMA) has made its way into data centers, earning a
spotlight in distributed systems research. RDMA provides the tra-
ditional send/receive communication primitives, but also allows
a process to directly read/write remote memory. Research work
shows that RDMA leads to some new and exciting distributed algo-
rithms [3, 9, 24, 30, 44, 48].
RDMA provides a different interface from previous communi-
cation mechanisms, as it combines message-passing with shared-
memory [3]. Furthermore, to safeguard the remote memory, RDMA
provides protection mechanisms to grant and revoke access for read-
ing and writing data. This mechanism is fine grained: an application
can choose subsets of remote memory called regions to protect; it
can choose whether a region can be read, written, or both; and it
can choose individual processes to be given access, where different
processes can have different accesses. Furthermore, protections are
dynamic: they can be changed by the application over time. In this
paper, we lay the groundwork for a theoretical understanding of
these RDMA capabilities, and we show that they lead to distributed
algorithms that are inherently more powerful than before.
While RDMA brings additional power, it also introduces some
challenges. With RDMA, the remote memories are subject to failures
that cause them to become unresponsive. This behavior differs from
traditional shared memory, which is often assumed to be reliable1.
In this paper, we show that the additional power of RDMA more
than compensates for these challenges.
Our main contribution is to show that RDMA improves on the fun-
damental trade-off in distributed systems between failure resilience
and performance—specifically, we show how a consensus protocol
can use RDMA to achieve both high resilience and high performance,
while traditional algorithms had to choose one or another. We illus-
trate this on the fundamental problem of achieving consensus and
capture the above RDMA capabilities as an M&M model [3], in
which processes can use both message-passing and shared-memory.
We consider asynchronous systems and require safety in all exe-
cutions and liveness under standard additional assumptions (e.g.,
partial synchrony). We measure resiliency by the number of failures
an algorithm tolerates, and performance by the number of (network)
delays in common-case executions. Failure resilience and perfor-
mance depend on whether processes fail by crashing or by being
Byzantine, so we consider both.
With Byzantine failures, we consider the consensus problem
called weak Byzantine agreement, defined by Lamport [36]. We
give an algorithm that (a) requires only n ≥ 2fP + 1 processes
(where fP is the maximum number of faulty processes) and (b) de-
cides in two delays in the common case. With crash failures, we
give the first algorithm for consensus that requires only n ≥ fP + 1
processes and decides in two delays in the common case. With both
Byzantine or crash failures, our algorithms can also tolerate crashes
of memory—onlym ≥ 2fM + 1 memories are required, where fM
is the maximum number of faulty memories. Furthermore, with
crash failures, we improve resilience further, to tolerate crashes of a
minority of the combined set of memories and processes.
Our algorithms appear to violate known impossibility results: it
is known that with message-passing, Byzantine agreement requires
n ≥ 3fP + 1 even if the system is synchronous [43], while consensus
with crash failures require n ≥ 2fP + 1 if the system is partially
synchronous [26]. There is no contradiction: our algorithms rely on
the power of RDMA, not available in other systems.
RDMA’s power comes from two features: (1) simultaneous access
to message-passing and shared-memory, and (2) dynamic permis-
sions. Intuitively, shared-memory helps resilience, message-passing
helps performance, and dynamic permissions help both.
To see how shared-memory helps resilience, consider the Disk
Paxos algorithm [28], which uses shared-memory (disks) but no
messages. Disk Paxos requires only n ≥ fP + 1 processes, matching
1There are a few studies of failure-prone memory, as we discuss in related work.
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the resilience of our algorithm. However, Disk Paxos is not as fast:
it takes at least four delays. In fact, we show that no shared-memory
consensus algorithm can decide in two delays (Section 6).
To see how message-passing helps performance, consider the
Fast Paxos algorithm [38], which uses message-passing and no
shared-memory. Fast Paxos decides in only two delays in common
executions, but it requires n ≥ 2fP + 1 processes.
Of course, the challenge is achieving both high resilience and
good performance in a single algorithm. This is where RDMA’s
dynamic permissions shine. Clearly, dynamic permissions improve
resilience against Byzantine failures, by preventing a Byzantine
process from overwriting memory and making it useless. More sur-
prising, perhaps, is that dynamic permissions help performance, by
providing an uncontended instantaneous guarantee: if each process
revokes the write permission of other processes before writing to a
register, then a process that writes successfully knows that it exe-
cuted uncontended, without having to take additional steps (e.g., to
read the register). We use this technique in our algorithms for both
Byzantine and crash failures.
In summary, our contributions are as follows:
• We consider distributed systems with RDMA, and we pro-
pose a model that captures some of its key properties while
accounting for failures of processes and memories, with sup-
port of dynamic permissions.
• We show that the shared-memory part of our RDMA improves
resilience: our Byzantine agreement algorithm requires only
n ≥ 2fP + 1 processes.
• We show that the shared-memory by itself does not permit
consensus algorithms that decide in two steps in common
executions.
• We show that with dynamic permissions, we can improve
the performance of our Byzantine Agreement algorithm, to
decide in two steps in common executions.
• We give similar results for the case of crash failures: decision
in two steps while requiring only n ≥ fP + 1 processes.
• Our algorithms can tolerate the failure of memories, up to a
minority of them.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 gives
an overview of related work. In Section 3 we formally define the
RDMA-compliant M&M model that we use in the rest of the paper,
and specify the agreement problems that we solve. We then proceed
to present the main contributions of the paper. Section 4 presents
our fast and resilient Byzantine agreement algorithm. In Section 5
we consider the special case of crash-only failures, and show an
improvement of the algorithm and tolerance bounds for this setting.
In Section 6 we briefly outline a lower bound that shows that the
dynamic permissions of RDMA are necessary for achieving our
results. Finally, in Section 7 we discuss the semantics of RDMA in
practice, and how our model reflects these features.
To ease readability, most proofs have been deferred to the Appen-
dices.
2 RELATEDWORK
RDMA. Many high-performance systems were recently proposed
using RDMA, such as distributed key-value stores [24, 30], com-
munication primitives [24, 31], and shared address spaces across
clusters [24]. Kaminsky et al. [32] provides guidelines for designing
systems using RDMA. RDMA has also been applied to solve con-
sensus [9, 44, 48]. Our model shares similarities with DARE [44]
and APUS [48], which modify queue-pair state at run time to prevent
or allow access to memory regions, similar to our dynamic permis-
sions. These systems perform better than TCP/IP-based solutions,
by exploiting better raw performance of RDMA, without changing
the fundamental communication complexity or failure-resilience of
the consensus protocol. Similarly, Rüsch et al. [45] use RDMA as a
replacement for TCP/IP in existing BFT protocols.
M&M. Message-and-memory (M&M) refers to a broad class of
models that combine message-passing with shared-memory, intro-
duced by Aguilera et al. in [3]. In that work, Aguilera et al. consider
M&M models without memory permissions and failures, and show
that such models lead to algorithms that are more robust to failures
and asynchrony. In particular, they give a consensus algorithm that
tolerates more crash failures than message-passing systems, but is
more scalable than shared-memory systems, as well as a leader elec-
tion algorithm that reduces the synchrony requirements. In this paper,
our goal is to understand how memory permissions and failures in
RDMA impact agreement.
Byzantine Fault Tolerance. Lamport, Shostak and Pease [39, 43]
show that Byzantine agreement can be solved in synchronous sys-
tems iff n ≥ 3fP + 1. With unforgeable signatures, Byzantine agree-
ment can be solved iff n ≥ 2fP + 1. In asynchronous systems subject
to failures, consensus cannot be solved [27]. However, this result is
circumvented by making additional assumptions for liveness, such
as randomization [10] or partial synchrony [17, 26]. Many Byzantine
agreement algorithms focus on safety and implicitly use the addi-
tional assumptions for liveness. Even with signatures, asynchronous
Byzantine agreement can be solved only if n ≥ 3fP + 1 [15].
It is well known that the resilience of Byzantine agreement varies
depending on various model assumptions like synchrony, signatures,
equivocation, and the exact variant of the problem to be solved. A
system that has non-equivocation is one that can prevent a Byzantine
process from sending different values to different processes. Table 1
summarizes some known results that are relevant to this paper.
Work Synchrony Signatures Non-Equiv StrongValidity Resiliency
[39] ✓ ✓ ✗ ✓ 2f + 1
[39] ✓ ✗ ✗ ✓ 3f + 1
[4, 40] ✗ ✓ ✓ ✓ 3f + 1
[20] ✗ ✓ ✗ ✗ 3f + 1
[20] ✗ ✗ ✓ ✗ 3f + 1
[20] ✗ ✓ ✓ ✗ 2f + 1
This paper ✗ ✓
✗
(RDMA) ✗ 2f + 1
Table 1: Known fault tolerance results for Byzantine agreement.
Our Byzantine agreement results share similarities with results
for shared memory. Malkhi et al. [40] and Alon et al. [4] show
bounds on the resilience of strong and weak consensus in a model
with reliable memory but Byzantine processes. They also provide
consensus protocols, using read-write registers enhanced with sticky
bits (write-once memory) and access control lists not unlike our
permissions. Bessani et al. [11] propose an alternative to sticky bits
and access control lists through Policy-Enforced Augmented Tuple
Spaces. All these works handle Byzantine failures with powerful
objects rather than registers. Bouzid et al. [13] show that 3fP + 1
processes are necessary for strong Byzantine agreement with read-
write registers.
Some prior work solves Byzantine agreement with 2fP+1 pro-
cesses using specialized trusted components that Byzantine pro-
cesses cannot control [18, 19, 21, 22, 33, 47]. Some schemes decide
in two delays but require a large trusted component: a coordina-
tor [18], reliable broadcast [22], or message ordering [33]. For us,
permission checking in RDMA is a trusted component of sorts, but
it is small and readily available.
At a high-level, our improved Byzantine fault tolerance is achieved
by preventing equivocation by Byzantine processes, thereby effec-
tively translating each Byzantine failure into a crash failure. Such
translations from one type of failure into a less serious one have ap-
peared extensively in the literature [8, 15, 20, 42]. Early work [8, 42]
shows how to translate a crash tolerant algorithm into a Byzantine
tolerant algorithm in the synchronous setting. Bracha [14] presents a
similar translation for the asynchronous setting, in which n ≥ 3fP +1
processes are required to tolerate fP Byzantine failures. Bracha’s
translation relies on the definition and implementation of a reliable
broadcast primitive; in this paper we define and implement a similar,
but weaker, broadcast primitive that can tolerate more failures due
to the capabilities of RDMA.
Faulty memory. Afek et al. [2] and Jayanti et al. [29] study the
problem of masking the benign failures of shared memory or objects.
We use their ideas of replicating data across memories. Abraham et
al. [1] considers honest processes but malicious memory.
Common-case executions. Many systems and algorithms tolerate
adversarial scheduling but optimize for common-case executions
without failures, asynchrony, contention, etc (e.g., [12, 23, 25, 34, 35,
38, 41]). None of these match both the resilience and performance
of our algorithms. Some algorithms decide in one delay but require
n ≥ 5fP + 1 for Byzantine failures [46] or n ≥ 3fP + 1 for crash
failures [16, 23].
3 MODEL AND PRELIMINARIES
We consider a message-and-memory (M&M) model, which allows
processes to use both message-passing and shared-memory [3]. The
system has n processes P = {p1, . . . ,pn } andm (shared) memories
M = {µ1, . . . , µm }. Processes communicate by accessing memories
or sending messages. Throughout the paper, memory refers to the
shared memories, not the local state of processes.
The system is asynchronous in that it can experience arbitrary
delays. We expect algorithms to satisfy the safety properties of
the problems we consider, under this asynchronous system. For
liveness, we require additional standard assumptions, such as partial
synchrony, randomization, or failure detection.
Memory permissions. Each memory consists of a set of reg-
isters. To control access, an algorithm groups those registers into
a set of (possibly overlapping) memory regions, and then defines
permissions for those memory regions. Formally, a memory region
mr of a memory µ is a subset of the registers of µ. We often refer
to mr without specifying the memory µ explicitly. Each memory
region mr has a permission, which consists of three disjoint sets
Figure 1: Our model with processes and memories, which may
both fail. Processes can send messages to each other or access
registers in the memories. Registers in a memory are grouped
into memory regions that may overlap, but in our algorithms
they do not. Each region has a permission indicating what pro-
cesses can read, write, and read-write the registers in the region
(shown for two regions).
of processes Rmr,Wmr, RWmr indicating whether each process can
read, write, or read-write the registers in the region. We say that p
has read permission on mr if p ∈ Rmr or p ∈ RWmr; we say that p
has write permission on mr if p ∈Wmr or p ∈ RWmr. In the special
case when Rmr = P \ {p}, Wmr = ∅, RWmr = {p}, we say that mr
is a Single-Writer Multi-Reader (SWMR) region—registers in mr
correspond to the traditional notion of SWMR registers. Note that
a register may belong to several regions, and a process may have
access to the register on one region but not another—this models the
existing RDMA behavior. Intuitively, when reading or writing data,
a process specifies the region and the register, and the system uses
the region to determine if access is allowed (we make this precise
below).
Permission change. An algorithm indicates an initial permission
for each memory region mr. Subsequently, the algorithm may wish
to change the permission of mr during execution. For that, processes
can invoke an operation changePermission(mr, new_perm), where
new_perm is a triple (R,W ,RW). This operation returns no results
and it is intended to modify Rmr,Wmr,RWmr to R,W ,RW. To toler-
ate Byzantine processes, an algorithm can restrict processes from
changing permissions. For that, the algorithm specifies a function
legalChange(p,mr, old_perm, new_perm) which returns a boolean
indicating whether process p can change the permission of mr to
new_perm when the current permissions are old_perm. More pre-
cisely, when changePermission is invoked, the system evaluates
legalChange to determine whether changePermission takes effect
or becomes a no-op. When legalChange always returns false, we
say that the permissions are static; otherwise, the permissions are
dynamic.
Accessing memories. Processes access the memories via opera-
tions write(mr, r ,v) and read(mr, r ) for memory region mr, register
r , and value v. A write(mr, r ,v) by process p changes register r
to v and returns ack if r ∈ mr and p has write permission on mr;
otherwise, the operation returns nak. A read(mr, r ) by process p
returns the last value successfully written to r if r ∈ mr and p has
read permission on mr; otherwise, the operation returns nak. In our
algorithms, a register belongs to exactly one region, so we omit the
mr parameter from write and read operations.
Sending messages. Processes can also communicate by sending
messages over a set of directed links. We assume messages are
unique. If there is a link from process p to process q, then p can
send messages to q. Links satisfy two properties: integrity and no-
loss. Given two correct processes p and q, integrity requires that
a message m be received by q from p at most once and only if m
was previously sent by p to q. No-loss requires that a message m
sent from p to q be eventually received by q. In our algorithms, we
typically assume a fully connected network so that every pair of
correct processes can communicate. We also consider the special
case when there are no links (see below).
Executions and steps. An execution is as a sequence of process
steps. In each step, a process does the following, according to its
local state: (1) sends a message or invokes an operation on a memory
(read, write, or changePermission), (2) tries to receive a message
or a response from an outstanding operation, and (3) changes local
state. We require a process to have at most one outstanding operation
on each memory.
Failures. A memorym may fail by crashing, which causes subse-
quent operations on its registers to hang without returning a response.
Because the system is asynchronous, a process cannot differentiate
a crashed memory from a slow one. We assume there is an upper
bound fM on the maximum number of memories that may crash.
Processes may fail by crashing or becoming Byzantine. If a process
crashes, it stops taking steps forever. If a process becomes Byzantine,
it can deviate arbitrarily from the algorithm. However, that process
cannot operate on memories without the required permission. We
assume there is an upper bound fP on the maximum number of
processes that may be faulty. Where the context is clear, we omit the
P and M subscripts from the number of failures, f .
Signatures. Our algorithms assume unforgeable signatures: there
are primitives sign(v) and sValid(p,v) which, respectively, signs a
value v and determines if v is signed by process p.
Messages and disks. The model defined above includes two
common models as special cases. In the message-passing model,
there are no memories (m = 0), so processes can communicate only
by sending messages. In the disk model [28], there are no links,
so processes can communicate only via memories; moreover, each
memory has a single region which always permits all processes to
read and write all registers.
Consensus
In the consensus problem, processes propose an initial value and
must make an irrevocable decision on a value. With crash failures,
we require the following properties:
• Uniform Agreement. If processes p and q decide vp and vq ,
then vp = vq .
• Validity. If some process decides v, then v is the initial value
proposed by some process.
• Termination. Eventually all correct processes decide.
We expect Agreement and Validity to hold in an asynchronous
system, while Termination requires standard additional assump-
tions (partial synchrony, randomization, failure detection, etc). With
Byzantine failures, we change these definitions so the problem can
be solved. We consider weak Byzantine agreement [36], with the
following properties:
• Agreement. If correct processes p and q decide vp and vq ,
then vp = vq .
• Validity. With no faulty processes, if some process decides
v, then v is the input of some process.
• Termination. Eventually all correct processes decide.
Complexity of algorithms. We are interested in the performance
of algorithms in common-case executions, when the system is syn-
chronous and there are no failures. In those cases, we measure perfor-
mance using the notion of delays, which extends message-delays to
our model. Under this metric, computations are instantaneous, each
message takes one delay, and each memory operation takes two de-
lays. Intuitively, a delay represents the time incurred by the network
to transmit a message; a memory operation takes two delays because
its hardware implementation requires a round trip. We say that a
consensus protocol is k-deciding if, in common-case executions,
some process decides in k delays.
4 BYZANTINE FAILURES
We now consider Byzantine failures and give a 2-deciding algorithm
for weak Byzantine agreement with n ≥ 2fP + 1 processes and
m ≥ 2fM + 1 memories. The algorithm consists of the composition
of two sub-algorithms: a slow one that always works, and a fast one
that gives up under hard conditions.
The first sub-algorithm, called Robust Backup, is developed in
two steps. We first implement a primitive called non-equivocating
broadcast, which prevents Byzantine processes from sending dif-
ferent values to different processes. Then, we use the framework
of Clement et al. [20] combined with this primitive to convert
a message-passing consensus algorithm that tolerates crash fail-
ures into a consensus algorithm that tolerates Byzantine failures.
This yields Robust Backup.2 It uses only static permissions and
assumes memories are split into SWMR regions. Therefore, this
sub-algorithm works in the traditional shared-memory model with
SWMR registers, and it may be of independent interest.
The second sub-algorithm is called Cheap Quorum. It uses dy-
namic permissions to decide in two delays using one signature in
common executions. However, the sub-algorithm gives up if the
system is not synchronous or there are Byzantine failures.
Finally, we combine both sub-algorithms using ideas from the
Abstract framework of Aublin et al. [7]. More precisely, we start by
running Cheap Quorum; if it aborts, we run Robust Backup. There
is a subtlety: for this idea to work, Robust Backup must decide on a
value v if Cheap Quorum decided v previously. To do that, Robust
Backup decides on a preferred value if at least f + 1 processes
have this value as input. To do so, we use the classic crash-tolerant
Paxos algorithm (run under the Robust Backup algorithm to ensure
2The attentive reader may wonder why at this point we have not achieved a 2-deciding
algorithm already: if we apply Clement et al. [20] to a 2-deciding crash-tolerant algo-
rithm (such as Fast Paxos [12]), will the result not be a 2-deciding Byzantine-tolerant
algorithm? The answer is no, because Clement et al. needs non-equivocated broadcast,
which incurs at least 6 delays.
Byzantine tolerance) but with an initial set-up phase that ensures
this safe decision. We call the protocol Preferential Paxos.
4.1 The Robust Backup Sub-Algorithm
We develop Robust Backup using the construction by Clement et
al. [20], which we now explain. Clement et al. show how to trans-
form a message-passing algorithm A that tolerates fP crash failures
into a message-passing algorithm that tolerates fP Byzantine failures
in a system where n ≥ 2fP + 1 processes, assuming unforgeable
signatures and a non-equivocation mechanism. They do so by imple-
menting trusted message-passing primitives, T-send and T-receive,
using non-equivocation and signature verification on every message.
Processes include their full history with each message, and then
verify locally whether a received message is consistent with the
protocol. This restricts Byzantine behavior to crash failures.
To apply this construction in our model, we show that our model
can implement non-equivocation and message passing. We first show
that shared-memory with SWMR registers (and no memory failures)
can implement these primitives, and then show how our model can
implement shared-memory with SWMR registers.
Consider a shared-memory system. While Clement et al. receive
and verify a message separately, we combine the two steps into one
primitive called non-equivocating broadcast.
DEFINITION 1. Non-equivocating broadcast is defined in terms of
two primitives, broadcast(k,m) and deliver(k,m,q). When a process
p invokes broadcast(k,m) we say that p broadcasts (k,m). When a
process p invokes deliver(k,m,q) we say that p delivers (k,m) from
q. Each correct process p must invoke broadcast(k, ∗) with k one
higher than p’s previous invocation (and first invocation with k=1).
The following holds:
(1) If a correct process p broadcasts (k,m), then all correct pro-
cesses eventually deliver (k,m) from p.
(2) If p and q are correct processes, p delivers (k,m) from r , and
q delivers (k,m′) from r , thenm=m′.
(3) If a correct process delivers (k,m) from p, p must have broad-
cast (k,m).
A correct implementation of non-equivocating broadcast replaces
the send and receive primitives with broadcast and deliver respec-
tively in Clement et al.’s implementation of T-send and T-receive.
We now show how to implement non-equivocating broadcast in
shared-memory. The idea of the algorithm is that before delivering a
message (k,m) from q, each process p checks that no other process
saw a different value from q. More specifically, each process p has
n memory slots per sequence number, that only p can write to, but
all processes can read from. These slots are initialized to ⊥, and p
uses them to write the values that it has seen. To broadcast its k-th
message, p simply writes a signed version of the message in slot
(k,p) of its memory. To deliver a message m from process q with
sequence number k, process p does three things: (1) p reads slot
(q,k) from q’s memory. If p reads ⊥ from q’s (k,q) slot, then q has
not yet sent any message with sequence number k; p retries at a
later time. If p reads a value that is not signed by q, it also restarts,
pretending that it did not see any value. (2) Otherwise, if p read
some signed valuem from q’s (k,q) slot, p writesm into slot (k,q) in
its own memory, and (3) p reads slot (k,q) in every other process’s
memory. If, for every other process r , p reads eitherm or ⊥ in (k,q)
Algorithm 2: Non-Equivocating Broadcast
1 SWMR slots[n,M,n]; initialized to ⊥. slots[p] is
↪→ array of SWMR(p) registers.
3 Code for process p to broadcast (k,m)
4 write(slots[p,j,p], sign((k,m)));
6 Code for process p
7 Last[n] is local array with last k delivered from
↪→ each process
8 while true {
9 for q in Π {
10 try_deliver(q); } }
12 try_deliver(q) {
13 k = Last[q]
14 val = (key,msg) = read(slots[q,k,q]);
15 if (val == ⊥ || !sValid(p, val) || key,k)
16 return; //q hasn't written anything or is
↪→ Byzantine. Will retry later.
17 Write(slots[p,k,q], val);
18 for i in Π {
19 otherV = (otherK, otherM) = read(slots[i,k,q]);
20 if (otherV , val && otherV , ⊥ && sValid(q,
↪→ otherV) && otherK == key)
21 return; } //q is Byzantine; no delivery.
22 deliver(k,msg, q)
23 Last[q] += 1 }
in r ’s memory, then p delivers q’s message. Otherwise, since other
processes cannot forge q’s signature, this means that q has tried to
equivocate, as some other process saw a different value when it read
from q. p handles this case by ignoring the value from q.
LEMMA 4.1. Non-equivocating broadcast is implementable in
shared-memory with SWMR regular registers.
The result of Clement et al. [20] and Lemma 4.1 immediately
imply the following result.
THEOREM 4.2. There exists an algorithm for weak Byzantine
agreement in a shared-memory system with SWMR regular registers,
signatures, and up to fP process crashes where n ≥ 2fP + 1.
In particular, we can implement weak Byzantine agreement by
taking any correct consensus algorithm A for the classic crash-only
message passing model, and replacing all its sends and receives
by non-equivocating broadcast and deliver (respectively) that also
attach a process’s entire execution history to each message. We
call this method of communication trusted sends and receives, or
simply T-send and T-receive primitives. Clement et al. [20] show
that implementing such T-send and T-receive primitives with non-
equivocation and signatures yields a Byzantine-tolerant replacement
for classic sends and receives. Algorithm 3 shows how to use non-
equivocating broadcast to implement T-send and T-receive. See
Clement et al. [20] for more details.
Non-equivocation in our model. To convert the above algorithm
to our model, where memory may fail, we use the ideas in [2, 6, 29]
to implement failure-free SWMR regular registers from the fail-
prone memory, and then run weak Byzantine agreement using those
regular registers. To implement an SWMR register, a process writes
or reads all memories, and waits for a majority to respond. When
reading, if p sees exactly one distinct non-⊥ value v across the
memories, it returns v; otherwise, it returns ⊥.
Algorithm 3: T-send and T-receive (due to Clement et al. [20])
with non-equivocating broadcast.
1 Local variables for each process:
2 int k = 0
3 history H = []
4 T-send(m) {
5 k++
6 broadcast(k,(m,H))
7 Append "sent(k,(m,H))" to H }
9 Upon deliver(k,(m,H),p):
10 Check whether all messages in H are properly signed,
↪→ and whether they correspond to a correct
↪→ history of the algorithm
11 if so,
12 T-receive(m,p)
13 add "received(sign(k,(m,H), p))" to H
DEFINITION 2. Let A be a message-passing algorithm. Robust
Backup(A) is the algorithm A in which all send and receive opera-
tions are replaced by T-send and T-receive operations (respectively)
implemented with non-equivocating broadcast.
Thus we get the following lemma, from the result of Clement et
al. [20], Lemma 4.1, and the above handling of memory failures.
LEMMA 4.3. If A is a consensus algorithm that is tolerant to f
process crash failures, then Robust Backup(A) is a weak Byzantine
agreement algorithm that is tolerant to up to fP Byzantine processes
and fM memory crashes, where n ≥ 2fP + 1 and m ≥ 2fM + 1 in
the message-and-memory model.
The following theorem is an immediate corrolary of the lemma.
THEOREM 4.4. There exists an algorithm for Weak Byzantine
Agreement in a message-and-memory model with up to fP Byzantine
processes and fM memory crashes, where n ≥ 2fP + 1 and m ≥
2fM + 1.
4.2 The Cheap Quorum Sub-Algorithm
We now give an algorithm that decides in two delays in common
executions in which the system is synchronous and there are no fail-
ures. It requires only one signature for a fast decision, whereas the
best prior algorithm requires 6fP + 2 signatures and n ≥ 3fP + 1 [7].
Our algorithm, called Cheap Quorum, is not in itself a complete
consensus algorithm; it may abort in some executions. If Cheap Quo-
rum aborts, it outputs an abort value, which is used to initialize the
Robust Backup so that their composition preserves weak Byzantine
agreement. This composition is inspired by the Abstract framework
of Aublin et al. [7].
The algorithm has a special process ℓ, say ℓ = p1, which serves
both as a leader and a follower. Other processes act only as follow-
ers. The memory is partitioned into n + 1 regions denoted Region[p]
for each p ∈ Π, plus an extra one for p1, Region[ℓ] in which it
proposes a value. Initially, Region[p] is a regular SWMR region
where p is the writer. Unlike in Algorithm 2, some of the permis-
sions are dynamic; processes may remove p1’s write permission to
Region[ℓ] (i.e., the legalChange function returns false to any permis-
sion change requests, except for ones revoking p1’s permission to
write on Region[ℓ]).
Algorithm 4: Cheap Quorum normal operation—code for pro-
cess p
1 Leader code
2 propose(v) {
3 sign(v);
4 status = Value[ℓ].write(v);
5 if (status == nak) Panic_mode();
6 else decide(v); }
8 Follower code
9 propose(w){
10 do {v = read(Value[ℓ]);
11 for all q ∈ Π do pan[q] = read(Panic[q]);
12 } until (v , ⊥ || pan[q] == true for some q ||
↪→ timeout);
13 if (v , ⊥ && sValid(p1,v)) {
14 sign(v);
15 write(Value[p],v);
16 do {for all q ∈ Π do val[q] = read(Value[q]);
17 if |{q : val[q] == v}| ≥ n then {
18 Proof[p].write(sign(val[1..n]));
19 for all q ∈ Π do prf[q] = read(Proof[q]);
20 if |{q : verifyProof(prf[q]) == true}| ≥
↪→ n { decide(v); exit; } }
21 for all q ∈ Π do pan[q] = read(Panic[q]);
22 } until (pan[q] == true for some q || timeout);
↪→ }
23 Panic_mode();}
Algorithm 5: Cheap Quorum panic mode—code for process p
1 panic_mode(){
2 Panic[p] = true;
3 changePermission(Region[ℓ], R: Π, W: {}, RW: {});
↪→ // remove write permission
4 v = read(Value[p]);
5 prf = read(Proof[p]);
6 if (v , ⊥){ Abort with ⟨v, prf ⟩; return; }
7 LVal = read(Value[ℓ]);
8 if (LVal , ⊥) {Abort with ⟨LVal, ⊥⟩; return;}
9 Abort with ⟨myInput, ⊥⟩; }
Processes initially execute under a normal mode in common-case
executions, but may switch to panic mode if they intend to abort,
as in [7]. The pseudo-code of the normal mode is in Algorithm 4.
Region[p] contains three registers Value[p], Panic[p], Proof[p] ini-
tially set to ⊥, false, ⊥. To propose v, the leader p1 signs v and
writes it to Value[ℓ]. If the write is successful (it may fail because
its write permission was removed), then p1 decides v; otherwise p1
calls Panic_mode(). Note that all processes, including p1, continue
their execution after deciding. However, p1 never decides again if
it decided as the leader. A follower q checks if p1 wrote to Value[ℓ]
and, if so, whether the value is properly signed. If so, q signs v,
writes it to Value[q], and waits for other processes to write the same
value to Value[∗]. If q sees 2f + 1 copies of v signed by different
processes, q assembles these copies in a unanimity proof, which
it signs and writes to Proof[q]. q then waits for 2f + 1 unanimity
proofs for v to appear in Proof[∗], and checks that they are valid,
in which case q decides v. This waiting continues until a timeout
expires3, at which time q calls Panic_mode(). In Panic_mode(), a
3The timeout is chosen to be an upper bound on the communication, processing and
computation delays in the common case.
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Figure 6: Interactions of the components of the Fast & Robust
Algorithm.
process p sets Panic[p] to true to tell other processes it is panicking;
other processes periodically check to see if they should panic too.
p then removes write permission from Region[ℓ], and decides on a
value to abort: either Value[p] if it is non-⊥, Value[ℓ] if it is non-⊥,
or p’s input value. If p has a unanimity proof in Proof[p], it adds it
to the abort value.
In Appendix B, we prove the correctness of Cheap Quorum,
and in particular we show the following two important agreement
properties:
LEMMA 4.5 (CHEAP QUORUM DECISION AGREEMENT). Let
p and q be correct processes. If p decides v1 while q decides v2, then
v1 = v2.
LEMMA 4.6 (CHEAP QUORUM ABORT AGREEMENT). Let p
and q be correct processes (possibly identical). If p decides v in
Cheap Quorum while q aborts from Cheap Quorum, then v will be
q’s abort value. Furthermore, if p is a follower, q’s abort proof is a
correct unanimity proof.
The above construction assumes a fail-free memory with regular
registers, but we can extend it to tolerate memory failures using the
approach of Section 4.1, noting that each register has a single writer
process.
4.3 Putting it Together: the Fast & Robust
Algorithm
The final algorithm, called Fast & Robust, combines Cheap Quorum
(§4.2) and Robust Backup (§4.1), as we now explain. Recall that
Robust Backup is parameterized by a message-passing consensus al-
gorithm A that tolerates crash-failures. A can be any such algorithm
(e.g., Paxos).
Roughly, in Fast & Robust, we run Cheap Quorum and, if it aborts,
we use a process’s abort value as its input value to Robust Backup.
However, we must carefully glue the two algorithms together to
ensure that if some correct process decided v in Cheap Quorum,
then v is the only value that can be decided in Robust Backup.
For this purpose, we propose a simple wrapper for Robust Backup,
called Preferential Paxos. Preferential Paxos first runs a set-up phase,
in which processes may adopt new values, and then runs Robust
Backup with the new values. More specifically, there are some pre-
ferred input values v1 . . .vk , ordered by priority. We guarantee that
every process adopts one of the top f +1 priority inputs. In particular,
this means that if a majority of processes get the highest priority
value, v1, as input, then v1 is guaranteed to be the decision value.
The set-up phase is simple; all processes send each other their input
values. Each process p waits to receive n − f such messages, and
adopts the value with the highest priority that it sees. This is the
value that p uses as its input to Paxos. The pseudocode for Prefer-
ential Paxos is given in Algorithm 8 in Appendix C, where we also
prove the following lemma about Preferential Paxos:
LEMMA 4.7 (PREFERENTIAL PAXOS PRIORITY DECISION).
Preferential Paxos implements weak Byzantine agreement with n ≥
2fP + 1 processes. Furthermore, let v1, . . . ,vn be the input values of
an instanceC of Preferential Paxos, ordered by priority. The decision
value of correct processes is always one of v1, . . . ,vf +1.
We can now describe Fast & Robust in detail. We start executing
Cheap Quorum. If Cheap Quorum aborts, we execute Preferential
Paxos, with each process receiving its abort value from Cheap Quo-
rum as its input value to Preferential Paxos. We define the priorities
of inputs to Preferential Paxos as follows.
DEFINITION 3 (INPUT PRIORITIES FOR PREFERENTIAL PAXOS).
The input values for Preferential Paxos as it is used in Fast & Robust
are split into three sets (here, p1 is the leader of Cheap Quorum):
• T = {v | v contains a correct unanimity proof }
• M = {v | v < T ∧v contains the signature of p1}
• B = {v | v < T ∧v < M}
The priority order of the input values is such that for all values
vT ∈ T , vM ∈ M , and vB ∈ B, priority(vT ) > priority(vM ) >
priority(vB ).
Figure 6 shows how the various algorithms presented in this
section come together to form the Fast & Robust algorithm. In
Appendices B and C, we show that Fast & Robust is correct, with
the following key lemma:
LEMMA 4.8 (COMPOSITION LEMMA). If some correct process
decides a value v in Cheap Quorum before an abort, then v is the
only value that can be decided in Preferential Paxos with priorities
as defined in Definition 3.
THEOREM 4.9. There exists a 2-deciding algorithm for Weak
Byzantine Agreement in a message-and-memory model with up to
fP Byzantine processes and fM memory crashes, where n ≥ 2fP + 1
andm ≥ 2fM + 1.
5 CRASH FAILURES
We now restrict ourselves to crash failures of processes and memo-
ries. Clearly, we can use the algorithms of Section 4 in this setting,
to obtain a 2-deciding consensus algorithm with n ≥ 2fP + 1 and
m ≥ 2fM + 1. However, this is overkill since those algorithms use
sophisticated mechanisms (signatures, non-equivocation) to guard
against Byzantine behavior. With only crash failures, we now show
it is possible to retain the efficiency of a 2-deciding algorithm while
improving resiliency. In Section 5.1, we first give a 2-deciding al-
gorithm that allows the crash of all but one process (n ≥ fP + 1)
and a minority of memories (m ≥ 2fM + 1). In Section 5.2, we
improve resilience further by giving a 2-deciding algorithm that
Algorithm 7: Protected Memory Paxos—code for process p
1 Regions: for i=1..m, Region[i] is all of memory i,
2 with initial permission (R:
↪→ Π − {p1 }, W: ∅, RW: {p1 } )
3 Registers: for i=1..m, p ∈ Π,
4 slot[i,p]: tuple (minProp,accProp, value)
↪→ in Region[i] // in memory i
5 Ω: failure detector that returns current leader
7 propose(v) {
8 repeat forever {
9 wait until Ω == p; // wait to become leader
10 propNr = choose number higher than any proposal
↪→ numbers seen before;
11 if (p , p1){
12 pfor i=1..m { // for each memory i
13 changePermission(Region[i], R:{Π-{p}},W:
↪→ ∅, RW:{p}); //get write perm
14 write1Success[i] = write(slot[i,p], {
↪→ propNr, ⊥, ⊥})
15 for all q ∈ Π do localInfo[i,q] = read(
↪→ slot[i,q]) }
16 wait for completion of m - fM iterations of
↪→ pfor loop
17 if (!write1Success[i] for some i) then
↪→ continue;
18 if (localInfo[i,q].minProp > propNr for some
↪→ i,q) continue;
19 if (localInfo[i,q].value = ⊥ for all i,q)
↪→ myValue = v
20 else myValue = localInfo[i,q].value where i,q
↪→ maximizes localInfo[i,q].accProp }
21 pfor i=1..m do write2Success[i] = write(slot[i,p
↪→ ], {propNr, propNr, myValue})
22 wait for completion of m - fM iterations of pfor
↪→ loop
23 if !write2Success[j] for some j then continue;
24 decide myValue }}
tolerates crashes of a minority of the combined set of memories and
processes.
5.1 Protected Memory Paxos
Our starting point is the Disk Paxos algorithm [28], which works in
a system with processes and memories where n ≥ fP + 1 andm ≥
2fM +1. This is our resiliency goal, but Disk Paxos takes four delays
in common executes. Our new algorithm, called Protected Memory
Paxos, removes two delays; it retains the structure of Disk Paxos
but uses permissions to skip steps. Initially some fixed leader ℓ = p1
has exclusive write permission to all memories; if another process
becomes leader, it takes the exclusive permission. Having exclusive
permission permits a leader ℓ to optimize execution, because ℓ can
do two things simultaneously: (1) write its consensus proposal and
(2) determine whether another leader took over. Specifically, if ℓ
succeeds in (1), it knows no leader ℓ′ took over because ℓ′ would
have taken the permission. Thus ℓ avoids the last read in Disk Paxos,
saving two delays. Of course, care must be taken to implement this
without violating safety.
The pseudocode of Protected Memory Paxos is in Algorithm 7.
Each memory has one memory region, and at any time exactly
one process can write to a region. Each memory i holds a register
slot[i,p] for each process p. Intuitively, slot[i,p] is intended for p to
write, but p may not have write permission to do that if it is not the
leader—in that case, no process writes slot[i,p].
When a process p becomes leader, it executes a special phase
(the first leader p1 can skip this phase), where p acquires exclusive
write permission for a majority of memories, writes a new proposal
number in its slot in a majority of memories, and then reads all
slots in a majority of memories. If any of p’s writes fail or p finds a
proposal with a higher proposal number, then p gives up. Otherwise,
p adopts the value with highest proposal number. In the next phase,
p writes its value to its slot in a majority of memories. If a write
fails, p gives up (then the current leader restarts the algorithm). If
p succeeds, this is where we optimize time: p can simply decide,
whereas Disk Paxos must read the memories again.
The code ensures that some correct process eventually decides,
but it is easy to extend it so all correct processes decide [17]. Also,
the code shows one instance of consensus, with p1 as initial leader.
With many consensus instances, the leader terminates one instance
and becomes the default leader in the next.
THEOREM 5.1. Consider a message-and-memory model with up
to fP process crashes and fM memory crashes, where n ≥ fP + 1
andm ≥ 2fM +1. There exists a 2-deciding algorithm for consensus.
5.2 Aligned Paxos
We now further enhance the failure resilience. We show that mem-
ories and processes are equivalent agents, in that it suffices for a
majority of the agents (processes and memories together) to remain
alive to solve consensus. Our new algorithm, Aligned Paxos, achieves
this resiliency. To do so, the algorithm relies on the ability to use
both the messages and the memories in our model; permissions are
not needed. The key idea is to align a message-passing algorithm and
a memory-based algorithm to use any majority of agents. We align
Paxos [37] and Protected Memory Paxos so that their decisions are
coordinated. More specifically, Protected Memory Paxos and Paxos
have two phases. To align these algorithms, we factor out their differ-
ences and replace their steps with an abstraction that is implemented
differently for each algorithm. The result is our Aligned Paxos algo-
rithm, which has two phases, each with three steps: communicate,
hear back, and analyze. Each step treats processes and memories
separately, and translates the results of operations on different agents
to a common language. We implement the steps using their ana-
logues in Paxos and Protected Memory Paxos4. The pseudocode of
Aligned Paxos is shown in Appendix E.
6 DYNAMIC PERMISSIONS ARE
NECESSARY FOR EFFICIENT CONSENSUS
In §5.1, we showed how dynamic permissions can improve the
performance of Disk Paxos. Are dynamic permissions necessary?
We prove that with shared memory (or disks) alone, one cannot
achieve 2-deciding consensus, even if the memory never fails, it
has static permissions, processes may only fail by crashing, and the
system is partially synchronous in the sense that eventually there is
a known upper bound on the time it takes a correct process to take a
step [26]. This result applies a fortiori to the Disk Paxos model [28].
4We believe other implementations are possible. For example, replacing the Protected
Memory Paxos implementation for memories with the Disk Paxos implementation
yields an algorithm that does not use permissions.
THEOREM 6.1. Consider a partially synchronous shared-memory
model with registers, where registers can have arbitrary static per-
missions, memory never fails, and at most one processes may fail by
crashing. No consensus algorithm is 2-deciding.
PROOF. Assume by contradiction that A is an algorithm in the
stated model that is 2-deciding. That is, there is some execution E
of A in which some process p decides a value v with 2 delays. We
denote by R and W the set of objects which p reads and writes in
E respectively. Note that since p decides in 2 delays in E, R and
W must be disjoint, by the definition of operation delay and the
fact that a process has at most one outstanding operation per object.
Furthermore, p must issue all of its read and writes without waiting
for the response of any operation.
Consider an execution E ′ in which p reads from the same set R
of objects and writes the same values as in E to the same setW of
objects. All of the read operations that p issues return by some time
t0, but the write operations of p are delayed for a long time. Another
process p′ begins its proposal of a value v ′ , v after t0. Since no
process other than p′ writes to any objects, E ′ is indistinguishable
to p′ from an execution in which it runs alone. Since A is a correct
consensus algorithm that terminates if there is no contention, p′ must
eventually decide valuev ′. Let t ′ be the time at which p′ decides. All
of p’s write operations terminate and are linearized in E ′ after time
t ′. Execution E ′ is indistinguishable to p from execution E, in which
it ran alone. Therefore, p decides v , v ′, violating agreement. □
Theorem 6.1, together with the Fast Paxos algorithm of Lam-
port [38], shows that an atomic read-write shared memory model
is strictly weaker than the message passing model in its ability to
solve consensus quickly. This result may be of independent interest,
since often the classic shared memory and message passing models
are seen as equivalent, because of the seminal computational equiv-
alence result of Attiya, Bar-Noy, and Dolev [6]. Interestingly, it is
known that shared memory can tolerante more failures when solving
consensus (with randomization or partial synchrony) [5, 15], and
therefore it seems that perhaps shared memory is strictly stronger
than message passing for solving consensus. However, our result
shows that there are aspects in which message passing is stronger
than shared memory. In particular, message passing can solve con-
sensus faster than shared memory in well-behaved executions.
7 RDMA IN PRACTICE
Our model is meant to reflect capabilities of RDMA, while providing
a clean abstraction to reason about. We now give an overview of how
RDMA works, and how features of our model can be implemented
using RDMA.
RDMA enables a remote process to access local memory directly
through the network interface card (NIC), without involving the
CPU. For a piece of local memory to be accessible to a remote
process p, the CPU has to register that memory region and associate
it with the appropriate connection (called Queue Pair) for p. The
association of a registered memory region and a queue pair is done
indirectly through a protection domain: both memory regions and
queue pairs are associated with a protection domain, and a queue
pair q can be used to access a memory region r if q and r and in the
same protection domain. The CPU must also specify what access
level (read, write, read-write) is allowed to the memory region in
each protection domain. A local memory area can thus be registered
and associated with several queue pairs, with the same or different
access levels, by associating it with one or more protection domains.
Each RDMA connection can be used by the remote server to access
registered memory regions using a unique region-specific key created
as a part of the registration process.
As highlighted by previous work [44], failures of the CPU, NIC
and DRAM can be seen as independent (e.g., arbitrary delays, too
many bit errors, failed ECC checks, respectively). For instance, zom-
bie servers in which the CPU is blocked but RDMA requests can
still be served account for roughly half of all failures [44]. This
motivates our choice to treat processes and memory separately in
our model. In practice, if a CPU fails permanently, the memory will
also become unreachable through RDMA eventually; however, in
such cases memory may remain available long enough for ongoing
operations to complete. Also, in practical settings it is possible for
full-system crashes to occur (e.g., machine restarts), which corre-
spond to a process and a memory failing at the same time—this is
allowed by our model.
Memory regions in our model correspond to RDMA memory
regions. Static permissions can be implemented by making the ap-
propriate memory region registration before the execution of the
algorithm; these permissions then persist during execution without
CPU involvement. Dynamic permissions require the host CPU to
change the access levels; this should be done in the OS kernel: the
kernel creates regions and controls their permissions, and then shares
memory with user-space processes. In this way, Byzantine processes
cannot change permissions illegally. The assumption is that the ker-
nel is not Byzantine. Alternatively, future hardware support similar
to SGX could even allow parts of the kernel to be Byzantine.
Using RDMA, a process p can grant permissions to a remote
process q by registering memory regions with the appropriate ac-
cess permissions (read, write, or read/write) and sending the corre-
sponding key to q. p can revoke permissions dynamically by simply
deregistering the memory region.
For our non-equivocation algorithm, each process can register
the two dimensional array of values in read-only mode with a pro-
tection domain. All the queue pairs used by that process are also
created in the context of the same protection domain. Addition-
ally, the process can preserve write access permission to its row
via another registration of just that row with the protection domain,
thus enabling single-writer multiple-reader access. Thereafter the
non-equivocation algorithm can be implemented trivially by using
RDMA reads and writes by all processes. Non-equivocation with
unreliable memories is similarly straightforward since failure of the
memory ensures that no process will be able to access the memory.
For Cheap Quorum, the static memory region registrations are
straightforward as above. To revoke the leader’s write permission, it
suffices for a region’s host process to deregister the memory region.
Panic messages can be relayed using RDMA message sends.
In our crash-only consensus algorithm, we leverage the capability
of registering overlapping memory regions in a protection domain.
As in above algorithms, each process uses one protection domain for
RDMA accesses. Queue pairs for connections to all other processes
are associated with this protection domain. The process’ entire slot
array is registered with the protection domain in read-only mode.
In addition, the same slot array can be dynamically registered (and
deregistered) in write mode based on incoming write permission
requests: A proposer requests write permission using an RDMA
message send. In response, the acceptor first deregisters write per-
mission for the immediate previous proposer. The acceptor thereafter
registers the slot array in write mode and responds to the proposer
with the new key associated with the newly registered slot array.
Reads of the slot array are performed by the proposer using RDMA
reads. Subsequent second phase RDMA write of the value can be
performed on the slot array as long as the proposer continues to
have write permission to the slot array. The RDMA write fails if
the acceptor granted write permission to another proposer in the
meantime.
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A CORRECTNESS OF NON-EQUIVOCATING
BROADCAST
OBSERVATION 1. In Algorithm 2, if p is a correct process, then
no slot that belongs to p is written to more than once.
PROOF. Since p is correct, p never writes on any slot more than
once. Furthermore, since all slots are single-writer registers, no other
process can write on these slots. □
LEMMA A.1. Let p and p′ be correct processes. If p′ reads a
non-⊥ valuem in slot [p,k,p] then p′ eventually delivers (k,m) from
p without restarting its delivery.
PROOF. Assume by contradiction that the lemma is false. Note
that the only value that p′ can deliver in this attempt is (k,m), since
this is the value it read on line 14. Note that p′ does not restart its
delivery attempt at line 16, since we assume it reads a non-⊥ value
from a correct process, which is therefore also signed correctly. So,
if it restarts, it must be on line 21. That is, it finds another process
q with a different valuem′ in slot [q,k,p] that passes all the checks
in line 20. However, since q cannot forge p’s signature, the value
written in [q,k,p] must be a value that p wrote at some point. Since
p only uses a sequence number key exactly once, for the slot key, q
must have copied over the value it saw in [p,k,p] (since the keys ofm
andm′ must be the same to pass the checks). However, if this value
is different from what p′ saw, this contradicts Observation 1. □
PROOF OF LEMMA 4.1. We prove the lemma by showing that
Algorithm 2 correctly implements non-equivocating broadcast. That
is, we need to show that Algorithm 2 satisfies the three properties of
non-equivocating broadcast.
Property 1. Let p be a correct process that broadcasts (k,m) at
some time t . That is, at time t , p writes a signed copy of k,m into
its k’th slot, [p,k,p]. We want to show that eventually every correct
process delivers (k,m) from p. Consider any correct process p′.
First we show that there exists a time t ′ > t at which p′ tries to
deliver the k’th message from p. That is, at t ′, p′ reads slot [p,k,p]
in line 14. Assume by contradiction that there is no such time t ′.
Note that p′ executes an infinite loop in which it tries to deliver the
next message from each process q infinitely often. So, if it never
tries to deliver p’s k’th message, one of two cases must happen:
Case 1. At p′, Last[p] = k ′ > k. That is, the last index that
p′ maintains for p is larger than k. However, this can only happen
if p′ incremented Last[p] in line 23. This means that p′ already
delivered a message from p with sequence number smaller than k ′.
By a simple inductive argument, this means that p′ already delivered
a message with sequence number k from p at some time s. If s > t ,
this contradicts the assumption that t ′ doesn’t exist. If s < t , then p
must have read a non-⊥ value from slot [p,k,p] in line 14 at a time
before t . However, this would mean that slot [p,k,p] is written to at
least twice, contradicting Observation 1.
Case 2. At p′, Last[p] < k forever. That is, p′ gets stuck with
an index less than k for p forever. Let k ′ be the index at which it is
stuck. That is, p′ never delivers p’s message with sequence number
k ′. Since p is correct and p has broadcast a message with key k > k ′,
it must have also broadcast a message with key k ′, and correctly
signed it. By Observation 1, p′ must eventually read this correctly
signed value from [p,k ′,p]. So by Lemma A.1, p′ delivers a message
from p in this attempt, and increments Last[p].
We now show that if p′ tries to deliver the k’th message from
p at time t ′ > t then p′ succeeds in this attempt and delivers the
correct value (k,m). Since t ′ > t and p is correct, by Observation 1,
p′ sees the value p wrote and successfully verifies it. Therefore, the
only value that p′ can deliver from p in this attempt is (k,m). By the
argument above, a Byzantine process q cannot prevent this delivery.
Property 2.We now prove the second property of non-equivocating
broadcast. Let p and p′ be any two correct processes, and q be some
process, such that p delivers (k,m) from q and p′ delivers (k,m′)
from q. We show that it must hold thatm =m′.
By Observation 1, all of p’s and p′’s slots are written to at most
once. Let the value written by p on slot [p,k,q] be valp , and the
value written by p′ on slot [p′,k,q] be valp′ . By inspecting the code,
it is easy to see that valp and valp′ are the values that p and p′
(respectively) read from slot [q,k,q], and must be equal tom andm′
respectively.
So, consider the time t in p’s execution at which p reads slot
[p′,k,q]. Note that p must have completed its write on slot [p,k,q]
at some time t ′ < t (line 17 in the code). We consider two cases:
Case 1. p reads the initial value ⊥ in slot [p′,k,q]. Then since all
slots are regular registers, this means that at time t , process p′ has
not yet completed its write on slot [p′,k,q] in line 17. Therefore, at
time t , p′ has not yet started its read of slot [p,k,q] at line 19. Since
the registers are regular, and we know that by t , p’s write on slot
[p,k,q] has completed, p′ must read value valp from slot [p,k,q]
when it executes its read in line 19. So, by the check on line 20,
valp′ must equal valp for p′ to deliver (k,m′).
Case 2. p reads valp′ in slot [p′,k,q]. Then for p to deliver (k,m),
it must pass the check on line 20, and therefore valp′ must equal
valp .
Property 3. Lastly, we show that if a correct process p delivers
(k,m) from a correct process p′, then p′ broadcast (k,m). Note that
correct processes only deliver values that are not⊥ and that they read
in line 14. By Observation 1, if p reads a non-⊥ value from [p′,k,p′]
then p′ must have broadcast this value, since p′ is correct. □
B CORRECTNESS OF CHEAP QUORUM
We prove that Cheap Quorum satisfies certain useful properties that
will help us show that it composes with Preferential Paxos to form
a correct weak Byzantine agreement protocol. For the proofs, we
first formalize some terminology. We say that a process proposed a
value v by time t if it successfully executes line 4; that is, p receives
the response ack in line 4 by t . When a process aborts, note that it
outputs a tuple. We say that the first element of its tuple is its abort
value, and the second is its abort proof. We sometimes say that a
process p aborts with value v and proof pr , meaning that p outputs
(v,pr ) in its abort. Furthermore, the value in a process p’s Proof
region is called a correct unanimity proof if it contains n copies of
the same value, each correctly signed by a different process.
OBSERVATION 2. In Cheap Quorum, no value written by a cor-
rect process is ever overwritten.
PROOF. By inspecting the code, we can see that the correct behav-
ior is for processes to never overwrite any values. Furthermore, since
all regions are initially single-writer, and the legalChange function
never allows another process to acquire write permission on a region
that they cannot write to initially, no other process can overwrite
these values. □
LEMMA B.1 (CHEAP QUORUM VALIDITY). In Cheap Quorum,
if there are no faulty processes and some process decides v, then v
is the input of some process.
PROOF. If p = p1, the lemma is trivially true, because p1 can only
decide on its input value. If p , p1, p can only decide on a value v if
it read that value from the leader’s region. Since only the leader can
write to its region, it follows that p can only decide on a value that
was proposed by the leader (p1). □
LEMMA B.2 (CHEAP QUORUM TERMINATION). If a correct
process p proposes some value, every correct process q will decide
a value or abort.
PROOF. Clearly, if q = p1 proposes a value, then q decides. Now
let q , p1 be a correct follower and assume p1 is a correct leader
that proposes v. Since p1 proposed v, p1 was able to write v in the
leader region, where v remains forever by Observation 2. Clearly,
if q eventually enters panic mode, then it eventually aborts; there is
no waiting done in panic mode. If q never enters panic mode, then q
eventually sees v on the leader region and eventually finds 2f + 1
copies of v on the regions of other followers (otherwise q would
enter panic mode). Thus q eventually decides v. □
LEMMA B.3 (CHEAP QUORUM PROGRESS). If the system is
synchronous and all processes are correct, then no correct process
aborts in Cheap Quorum.
PROOF. Assume the contrary: there exists an execution in which
the system is synchronous and all processes are correct, yet some
process aborts. Processes can only abort after entering panic mode,
so let t be the first time when a process enters panic mode and let p
be that process. Since p cannot have seen any other process declare
panic, p must have either timed out at line 12 or 22, or its checks
failed on line 13. However, since the entire system is synchronous
and p is correct, p could not have panicked because of a time-out at
line 12. So, p1 must have written its value v, correctly signed, to p1’s
region at a time t ′ < t . Therefore, p also could not have panicked by
failing its checks on line 13. Finally, since all processes are correct
and the system is synchronous, all processes must have seen p1’s
value and copied it to their slot. Thus, p must have seen these values
and decided on v at line 20, contradicting the assumption that p
entered panic mode. □
LEMMA B.4 (LEMMA 4.5: CHEAP QUORUM DECISION AGREE-
MENT). Let p and q be correct processes. If p decides v1 while q
decides v2, then v1 = v2.
PROOF. Assume the property does not hold: p decided some
value v1 and q decided some different value v2. Since p decided v1,
then p must have seen a copy of v1 at 2fP + 1 replicas, including q.
But then q cannot have decided v2, because by Observation 2, v1
never gets overwritten from q’s region, and by the code, q only can
decide a value written in its region. □
LEMMA B.5 (LEMMA 4.6: CHEAP QUORUM ABORT AGREE-
MENT). Let p and q be correct processes (possibly identical). If p
decides v in Cheap Quorum while q aborts from Cheap Quorum,
then v will be q’s abort value. Furthermore, if p is a follower, q’s
abort proof is a correct unanimity proof.
PROOF. If p = q, the property follows immediately, because of
lines 4 through 6 of panic mode. If p , q, we consider two cases:
• If p is a follower, then for p to decide, all processes, and in
particular, q, must have replicated both v and a correct proof
of unanimity before p decided. Therefore, by Observation 2,
v and the unanimity proof are still there when q executes the
panic code in lines 4 through 6. Therefore q will abort with v
as its value and a correct unanimity proof as its abort proof.
• If p is the leader, then first note that since p is correct, by
Observation 2 v remains the value written in the leader’s
Value region. There are two cases. If q has replicated a value
into its Value region, then it must have read it fromValue[p1],
and therefore it must be v. Again by Observation 2, v must
still be the value written in q’s Value region when q executes
the panic code. Therefore q aborts with value v. Otherwise,
if q has not replicated a value, then q’s Value region must
be empty at the time of the panic, since the legalChange
function disallows other processes from writing on that region.
Therefore q reads v from Value[p1] and aborts with v. □
LEMMA B.6. Cheap Quorum is 2-deciding.
PROOF. Consider an execution in which every process is correct
and the system is synchronous. Then no process will enter panic
mode (by Lemma B.3) and thus p1 will not have its permission
revoked. p1 will therefore be able to write its input value to p1’s
region and decide after this single write (2 delays). □
C CORRECTNESS OF THE FAST & ROBUST
The following is the pseudocode of Preferential Paxos. Recall that
T-send and T-receive are the trusted message passing primitives
that are implemented in [20] using non-equivocating broadcast and
signatures.
Algorithm 8: Preferential Paxos—code for process p
1 propose((v, priorityTag)){
2 T-send(v, priorityTag) to all;
3 Wait to T-receive (val,priorityTag) from n − fP
↪→ processes;
4 best = value with highest priority out of
↪→ messages received;
5 RobustBackup(Paxos).propose(best); }
LEMMA C.1 (LEMMA 4.7: PREFERENTIAL PAXOS PRIORITY
DECISION). Preferential Paxos implements weak Byzantine agree-
ment with n ≥ 2fP + 1 processes. Furthermore, let v1, . . . ,vn be
the input values of an instance C of Preferential Paxos, ordered by
priority. The decision value of correct processes is always one of
v1, . . . ,vfP+1.
PROOF. By Lemma 4.3, Robust Backup(Paxos) solves weak
Byzantine agreement with n ≥ 2fP + 1 processes. Note that be-
fore calling Robust Backup(Paxos), each process may change its
input, but only to the input of another process. Thus, by the correct-
ness and fault tolerance of Paxos, Preferential Paxos clearly solves
weak Byzantine agreement with n ≥ 2fP +1 processes. Thus we only
need to show that Preferential Paxos satisfies the priority decision
property with 2fP + 1 processes that may only fail by crashing.
Since Robust Backup(Paxos) satisfies validity, if all processes
call Robust Backup(Paxos) in line 5 with a value v that is one of
the fP + 1 top priority values (that is, v ∈ {v1, . . . ,vfP+1}), then the
decision of correct processes will also be in {v1, . . . ,vfP+1}. So we
just need to show that every process indeed adopts one of the top
fP +1 values. Note that each process p waits to see n− fP values, and
then picks the highest priority value that it saw. No process can lie or
pick a different value, since we use T-send and T-receive throughout.
Thus, p can miss at most fP values that are higher priority than the
one that it adopts. □
We now prove the following key composition property that shows
that the composition of Cheap Quorum and Preferential Paxos is
safe.
LEMMA C.2 (LEMMA 4.8: COMPOSITION LEMMA). If some
correct process decides a value v in Cheap Quorum before an abort,
then v is the only value that can be decided in Preferential Paxos
with priorities as defined in Definition 3.
PROOF. To prove this lemma, we mainly rely on two properties:
the Cheap Quorum Abort Agreement (Lemma 4.6) and Preferential
Paxos Priority Decision (Lemma 4.7). We consider two cases.
Case 1. Some correct follower process p , p1 decided v in Cheap
Quorum. Then note that by Lemma 4.6, all correct processes aborted
with value v and a correct unanimity proof. Since n ≥ 2f + 1, there
are at least f + 1 correct processes. Note that by the way we assign
priorities to inputs of Preferential Paxos in the composition of the
two algorithms, all correct processes have inputs with the highest
priority. Therefore, by Lemma 4.7, the only decision value possible
in Preferential Paxos is v. Furthermore, note that by Lemma 4.5, if
any other correct process decided in Cheap Quorum, that process’s
decision value was also v.
Case 2. Only the leader, p1, decides in Cheap Quorum, and p1 is
correct. Then by Lemma 4.6, all correct processes aborted with value
v. Since p1 is correct, v is signed by p1. It is possible that some of
the processes also had a correct unanimity proof as their abort proof.
However, note that in this scenario, all correct processes (at least
f + 1 processes) had inputs with either the highest or second highest
priorities, all with the same abort value. Therefore, by Lemma 4.7,
the decision value must have been the value of one of these inputs.
Since all these inputs had the same value v, v must be the decision
value of Preferential Paxos. □
THEOREM C.3 (END-TO-END VALIDITY). In the Fast & Robust
algorithm, if there are no faulty processes and some process decides
v, then v is the input of some process.
PROOF. Note that by Lemmas B.1 and 4.7, this holds for each of
the algorithms individually. Furthermore, recall that the abort values
of Cheap Quorum become the input values of Preferential Paxos,
and the set-up phase does not invent new values. Therefore, we just
have to show that if Cheap Quorum aborts, then all abort values
are inputs of some process. Note that by the code in panic mode, if
Cheap Quorum aborts, a process p can output an abort value from
one of three sources: its own Value region, the leader’s Value region,
or its own input value. Clearly, if its abort value is its input, then we
are done. Furthermore note that a correct leader only writes its input
in the Value region, and correct followers only write a copy of the
leader’s Value region in their own region. Since there are no faults,
this means that only the input of the leader may be written in any
Value region, and therefore all processes always abort with some
processes input as their abort value. □
THEOREM C.4 (END-TO-END AGREEMENT). In the Fast &
Robust algorithm, if p and q are correct processes such that p decides
v1 and q decides v2, then v1 = v2.
PROOF. First note that by Lemmas 4.5 and 4.7, each of the algo-
rithms satisfy this individually. Thus Lemma 4.8 implies the theo-
rem. □
THEOREM C.5 (END-TO-END TERMINATION). In Fast & Ro-
bust algorithm, if some correct process is eventually the sole leader
forever, then every correct process eventually decides.
PROOF. Assume towards a contradiction that some correct pro-
cess p is eventually the sole leader forever, and let t be the time when
p last becomes leader. Now consider some process q that has not
decided before t . We consider several cases:
(1) If q is executing Preferential Paxos at time t , then q will even-
tually decide, by termination of Preferential Paxos (Lemma 4.7).
(2) If q is executing Cheap Quorum at time t , we distinguish two
sub-cases:
(a) p is also executing as the leader of Cheap Quorum at time
t . Then p will eventually propose a value, so q will ei-
ther decide in Cheap Quorum or abort from Cheap Quo-
rum (by Lemma B.2) and decide in Preferential Paxos by
Lemma 4.7.
(b) p is executing in Preferential Paxos. Then p must have
panicked and aborted from Cheap Quorum. Thus, q will
also abort from Cheap Quorum and decide in Preferential
Paxos by Lemma 4.7. □
Note that to strengthen C.5 to general termination as stated in our
model, we require the additional standard assumption [37] that some
correct process p is eventually the sole leader forever. In practice,
however, p does not need to be the sole leader forever, but rather
long enough so that all correct processes decide.
D CORRECTNESS OF PROTECTED
MEMORY PAXOS
In this section, we present the proof of Theorem 5.1. We do so by
showing the Algorithm 7 is an algorithm that satisfies all of the
properties in the theorem.
We first show that Algorithm 7 correctly implements consensus,
starting with validity. Intuitively, validity is preserved because each
process that writes any value in a slot either writes its own value, or
adopts a value that was previously written in a slot. We show that
every value written in any slot must have been the input of some
process.
THEOREM D.1 (VALIDITY). In Algorithm 7, if a process p de-
cides a value v, then v was the input to some process.
PROOF. Assume by contradiction that some process p decides
a value v and v is not the input of any process. Since v is not the
input value of p, then p must have adopted v by reading it from
some process p′ at line 15. Note also that a process cannot adopt
the initial value, and thus, v must have been written in p′’s memory
by some other process. Thus we can define a sequence s1, s2, . . . , sk ,
where si adopts v from the location where it was written by si+1
and s1 = p. This sequence is necessarily finite since there have been
a finite number of steps taken up to the point when p decided v.
Therefore, there must be a last element of the sequence, sk who
wrote v in line 21 without having adopted v. This implies v was sk ’s
input value, a contradiction. □
We now focus on agreement.
THEOREM D.2 (AGREEMENT). In Algorithm 7, for any pro-
cesses p and q, if p and q decide values vp and vq respectively, then
vp = vq .
Before showing the proof of the theorem, we first introduce the
following useful lemma.
LEMMA D.3. The values a leader accesses on remote memory
cannot change between when it reads them and when it writes them.
PROOF. Recall that each memory only allows write-access to the
most recent process that acquired it. In particular, that means that
each memory only gives access to one process at a time. Note that
the only place at which a process acquires write-permissions on a
memory is at the very beginning of its run, before reading the values
written on the memory. Therefore, if a process p succeeds in writing
on memorym, then no other process could have acquired d after p
did, and therefore, no other process could have changed the values
written onm after p’s read ofm. □
PROOF OF THEOREM D.2. Let bp and bq be the proposal num-
bers with which vp and vq are decided, respectively. We assume
without loss of generality that bp ≤ bq . Using induction on bq , we
can assume that if some processor r starts phase 2 with proposal
number br such that bp ≤ br < bq , then it does so with value = vp .
Let Wp (resp. Wq ) be the set of memories to which p (resp. q)
successfully wrote in phase 2 line 21 before deciding vp (resp. vq ).
Since Wp and Wq are both majorities, their intersection must be
non-empty. Let m be any memory inWp ∩Wq . Both p and q must
have successfully written tom in lines 14 and 21 and read fromm in
line 15.
Since bp ≤ bq , p’s read at m must have preceded q’s phase
1 write at m (otherwise p would have seen q’s proposal number
and restarted). This implies that p’s phase 2 write at m must have
preceded q’s phase 1 write at m (by Lemma D.3). Thus q must
have seen vp during its read. Let sl be any other slot that q saw
during its read. Since q did not restart, sl .minProposal < bq . Since
sl .minProposal ≥ sl .accProposal for any slot, it follows that sl .accProposal <
bq . If sl .accProposal < bp , q cannot have adopted sl .value in
line 20. If sl .accProposal ≥ bp , then by the induction hypothesis,
sl .value = vp . Thus, q must have adopted value vp in line 20, thus
proving that vp = vq . □
Finally, we prove that the termination property holds.
THEOREM D.4 (TERMINATION). Eventually, all correct pro-
cesses decide.
PROOF. The Ω failure detector guarantees that eventually, all
processes trust the same correct process p. Let t be the time after
which all processes trust p forever. At some time t ′ ≥ t , all processes
except p will be blocked at line 9. Therefore, the minProposal values
of all memories, on all slots except those of p stop increasing. Thus,
eventually, p picks a propNr that is larger than all others written on
any memory, and stops restarting at line 18. Furthermore, since no
process other than p is executing any steps of the algorithm, and in
particular, no process other than p ever acquires any memory after
time t ′, p never loses its permission on any of the memories. So,
all writes executed by p on any correct memory must return ack.
Therefore, p will decide and broadcast its decision to all. All correct
processes will receive p’s decision and decide as well. □
To complete the proof of Theorem 5.1, we now show that Algo-
rithm 7 is 2-deciding.
THEOREM D.5. Algorithm 7 is 2-deciding.
PROOF. Consider an execution in which p1 is timely, and no pro-
cess’s failure detector ever suspects p1. Then, since no process thinks
itself the leader, and processes do not deviate from their protocols,
no process calls changePermission on any memory. Furthermore,
p1’s firstAttempt flag is set, since it never switched leaders. So, since
p1 initially has write permission on all memories, all of p1’s writes
succeed. Therefore, p1 terminates, deciding its own proposed value
v, after one write per memory. □
Algorithm 13: Communicate Phase 2—code for process p
1 bool communicate2(agent a, value msg){
2 if (a is memory){
3 return write(a[p], {msg.propNr, msg.propNr, msg.
↪→ val})}
4 else{
5 send accepted(msg.propNr, msg.val) to a
6 return true } }
Algorithm 14: Hear Back Phase 2—code for process p
1 value hearback2(agent a){
2 if (a is memory){
3 return ack }
4 else{
5 return value received from a } }
Algorithm 15: Analyze Phase 2—code for process p
1 value analyze2(value v, responses resps){
2 if there are at least A/2 + 1 resps such that resp.
↪→ response==ack{
3 return v }
4 return RESTART }
E PSEUDOCODE FOR THE ALIGNED PAXOS
Algorithm 9: Aligned Paxos
1 A=(P, M) is set of acceptors
2 propose(v){
3 resps = [] //prepare empty responses list
4 choose propNr bigger than any seen before
5 for all a in A{
6 cflag = communicate1(a, propNr)
7 resp = hearback1(a)
8 if (cflag){resps.append((a, resp)) } }
9 wait until resps has responses from a majority of A
10 next = analyze1(resps)
11 if (next == RESTART) restart;
12 resps = []
13 for all a in A{
14 cflag = communicate2(a, next)
15 resp = hearback2(a)
16 if (cflag){resps.append((a, resp)) } }
17 wait until resps has responses from a majority of A
18 next = analyze2(resps)
19 if (next == RESTART) restart;
20 decide next; }
Algorithm 10: Communicate Phase 1—code for process p
1 bool communicate1(agent a, value propNr){
2 if (a is memory){
3 changePermission(a, {(R:Π-{p}, W:∅, RW: {p}); //
↪→ acquire write permission
4 return write(a[p], {propNr, -, -}) }
5 else{
6 send prepare(propNr) to a
7 return true } }
Algorithm 11: Hear Back Phase 1—code for process p
1 value hearback1(agent a){
2 if (a is memory){
3 for all processes q{
4 localInfo[q] = read(a[q]) }
5 return = localInfo}
6 else{
7 return value received from a } }
Algorithm 12: Analyze Phase 1—code for process p
1 responses is a list of (agent, response) pairs
2 value analyze1(responses resps){
3 for resp in resps {
4 if (resp.agent is memory){
5 for all slots s in v.info {
6 if (s.minProposal > propNr) return RESTART }
7 (v, accProposal) = value and accProposal of slot
↪→ with highest
8 accProposal that had a value } }
9 return v where (v, accProposal) is the highest
↪→ accProposal seen in resps.response of all
↪→ agents }
